Abstract. In this paper I would like to argue that Stoic logic is a kind of relevant logic rather than the classical logic. To realize this purpose I will try to keep as close as possible to Stoic calculus as expressed with the help of their arguments.
Introduction
What in fact is Stoic logic? Is it classical? This is a long-standing question. Before the contribution of Peirce and Łukasiewicz Stoic logic was considered to be merely a continuation of the ideas of Aristotle and the Peripatetic school. However, a series of works by Łukasiewicz initiated the consideration of Stoic logic as a propositional calculus [2] . Now it is rather common to consider Stoic logic as equal to the classical calculus. Is it true however?
Data about Stoic logic
Let us shortly resume what we know about Stoic logic:
1. The Stoics paid attention to the form of an expression, seeing that in some cases this determines meaning. 2. The Stoics had deep insights about what is important in logic. They discussed, for instance, the nature of implication and distinguished at least four ways of understanding conditional statements. 3. The Stoics had created the calculus for the purpose of reasoning and focused their attention on what conclusion follows from premises. So they used arguments. This is a prototype of today's sequent, meaning an ordered pair of sequences of formulas.
Thus when we consider Stoic calculus we should talk about a calculus of sequents rather than about sets of true expressions. Some of these arguments the Stoics considered as undemonstrated. They believed that these arguments did not demand proof. Today we would say that they treated them as primitive rules of inference in a system of natural deduction. They accepted at least five of them and used some kind of variables to express these rules.
We have examples of substitution in their arguments 1 , we can therefore either consider schemas of sequents instead of sequents or add the rule of substitution.
Let me use X, Y for sequences of formulas and A, B for a single formula. The five undemonstrated stoic arguments are as follows:
rules for the (excluding) disjunction
Stoic proofs probably looked as follows: They assumed premises of the argument under consideration and used their undemonstrated arguments to obtain the required conclusion. Thus their proofs were similar to the proofs in modern natural deduction systems.
Besides the above-mentioned undemonstrated (primitive) arguments, the Stoics also used four rules called themata. They tried to reduce the other arguments to the five axioms using these four rules of inference of arguments. We know only two of these four rules 2 :
The rule (MT3) is known as the cut rule. 3 According to Benson Mates ([3]) a certain version of the third thema or maybe one of the missing themata was the so-called theorema
To resume, we could understand the Stoics' undemonstrated arguments as axioms and their themata as rules of inference ofthe sequents calculus. From the natural deduction point of view, they could also be understood as metarules.
To be more strict, let us accept the following formal definition of the notion of proof which formalise the intuitive understanding of proofs in the sequents calculus: Definition 1. An argument X ⊢ A has the proof (in the sequents calculus) iff there is a sequence of sequents S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n , such that: 1 • S n is identical with X ⊢ A and for each 1 i n either: 2 • S i is a sequent which belongs to the schema (Rk) or (Rk ′ ), for some 1 k 5, or 3 • S i is a seqent obtained from sequents previosly accepted by use of (MT3).
We also know 4 that Stoics used also a so-called principle of conditionalisation, which was a sort of the deduction theorem. Roughly speaking, it states that a conclusion is derivable from the premises iff the conditional, in which the antecedent is a conjunction of premises and the consequent is the conclusion, is logically valid. We have to say that unfortunately we don't have any example of the use of this rule as a rule of derivation.
Stoic logic = the relevant logic R?
Let me restrict myself to a consideration of the implicational part of Stoic logic. Thanks to Sextus Emiricus we know, that the Stoics were not ready to accept redundant arguments, i.e. arguments which among their premises have at least one which is not necessary to derive conclusion. Stoics didn't like to accept sequents of the form: A, B ⊢ A. 5 Notice, that Benson Mates perhaps defending thesis that Stoic logic was classical, supposes that Sextus is wrong here. On the other hand we haven't got possibility of weakening sequents. These two observations bring to mind the calculae of entailment and relevant logics. Let us remind ourselves of the implicational part of relevant logic R expressed in the sequent language:
Implication on the right
We know that at least some Stoics acknowledged rules (Id) since they considered identity low: A → A, so by detachment rule (DT2) they should accept (Id) as well.
It is rather clear that without refusing the spirit of Stoic logic we can add to the Stoics rules the rule of contraction (Contr) and permutation (Perm).
The rule implication on the right needs more attention. Besides the rule of conditionalisation we don't have any possibility of proving any sequent with the implication in the conclusion. But since (DT1) is a version of the deduction theorem, it is acceptable to add (⊢→) to the reconstructed Stoic system.
Formally we have to change our definition of the notion of the proof : Definition 2. An argument X ⊢ A has the proof (in the implicational part of sequents calculus) iff there is a sequence of sequents S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S n , such:
1 • S n is identical with X ⊢ A and for each 1 i n either: 2 • S i is a sequent which belongs to the schema (R1) or (Id), or 3 • S i is a sequent obtained from sequents previously accepted by use of (MT3), (Contr), (Perm) or (⊢→).
We have the following theorem:
An argument has the proof in R iff it has the proof in the sense of the Definition 2.
Proof (draft). Firstly, we have to show that each sequent provable in our system has also proof in the logic R. Since (Contr), (Perm) and (⊢→) are just the same in both calculi, it is enough to show that (R1) and (MT3) can be proved in the logic R. Using (→⊢) we can prove the sequent (R1):
By our last observation it is easy to see, that each proof in the sense of the Definition 2, can be rewritten as a proof in the implicational part of (R1) with aditional (MT3), but by the "Elimination Theorem" the cut rule can be eliminated 6 , therefore the system R contains the implicational part of our system.
In the opposite direction, we have to show that the third rule (→⊢) can be proved in the Stoic system. By using their third metarule and the first undemonstrated argument we indeed obtain: 
Conclusion
The Stoics started investigation of sententional calculae in general. They also provided the foundations for modal propositional logic and, of course, the classical logic. Their main calculus was however more close to the relevant logic rather then to the classical one.
